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Abstract: Several studies suggest that the introduction of the Euro has triggered sizeable 
increases in intra-Euro area trade. In this paper we test whether these gains are distributed 
asymmetrically among Euro area countries with respect to country size. This hypothesis is 
motivated by Casella (1996), who postulates that small countries of a trade bloc gain more from 
its enlargement. We argue that the implications of this model do also apply to the introduction of 
a common currency and test for a small country bonus using aggregate trade data and 
disaggregated trade data at the SITC1, SITC2, and SITC3 level. The results suggest that there is 
indeed strong evidence for a small country bonus with respect to the gains from trade after the 
introduction of the Euro. On average, the Euro triggered a reallocation of intra-Euro area exports 
to small countries by some 6 percent .  
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I. Introduction 
There is wide agreement that the introduction of the Euro has led to an increase in trade of the 
Euro area member states, though the magnitude of the estimates varies considerable across 
studies. In his comprehensive survey, Baldwin finds that the effect is likely to lie “somewhere 
between 5% and 15%, with 9% being the best estimate” (Baldwin, 2006a, p. 1).  
This paper does not attempt to provide another estimate of the Euro’s overall trade effects. 
Instead we take it as given that the Euro has led to an increase in intra-Euro area trade and 
investigate, whether small Euro area countries gained relatively more. There is comparably little 
evidence on country-specific gains. The few studies, which consider trade effects by country 
suggest that the largest winners – in descending order – were Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Belgium, France and Ireland, while Portugal and Finland appear to have lost trade 
as a result of the Euro (see Baldwin, 2006a, p. 59). Overall, results are inconclusive and – judged 
by the standard errors of the estimates – it remains an open issue whether there are statistically 
significant differences in the country-specific effects.  
This paper takes a more direct approach to test for asymmetric gains from trade with 
respect to country size. Our empirical analysis is motivated theoretically by Casella (1996), who 
considers the distribution of the gains from enlarging a trade block among its member states in a 
model with monopolistic competition and increasing returns, where the size of the domestic 
market is an important determinant of competitiveness. Enlarging a trade bloc increases the size 
of the market to which all countries have easy access; this increase will be more significant for 
firms located in small countries, whose own domestic market is small. As a consequence, the 
increase in competitiveness is relatively larger for (firms in) small countries, such that the entry 
of new members in a trade bloc will favor small countries. 
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In this model, enlarging a trade bloc means nothing else but a reduction in trade costs vis-à-
vis the new trading partners. As we will argue in more detail below, the introduction of the Euro 
has also led to a reduction in trade costs vis-à-vis the other Euro area countries. Hence, it can be 
interpreted as “enlargement” of the market that can be reached with relative ease and the 
implications of the model by Casella (1996) do also apply to the creation of a common currency. 
In addition, for several reasons outlined below the introduction of the Euro offers a particularly 
valuable source for testing for a small country bonus. 
We use a panel data approach to test for a small country bonus with respect to the trade 
effects of the Euro, considering a relative gravity equation where the dependent variable is the 
ratio of the large to the small country’s exports with other Euro area countries over the period 
1994 to 2005. The model is estimated using both aggregate trade and disaggregated trade data at 
the SITC1, SITC2, and SITC3 level.  
As expected, a small country bonus does not show up always and everywhere. But overall, 
our results are supportive to the theoretical predictions by Casella (1996). At the industry level, in 
a majority of the SITC groups considered, we find that small countries gained more on average. 
This is confirmed if we aggregate the industry-specific results and also if we estimate the model 
for aggregate exports. On average over all models, we find that the Euro has led to a 
‘reallocation’ of intra-Euro area exports to small countries by some 6 percent. Moreover, there is 
also evidence that the relative gains of the small countries are larger, the larger the size difference 
to the large country.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the theoretical 
background why small countries should gain more from the Euro and sets up the empirical 
model. Section III presents the estimation results. Section IV concludes.  
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II. Theoretical Background and Empirical Model  
1. Why small countries should gain more from the Euro 
Before turning to the empirical model, we briefly review the theoretical reference model by 
Casella (1996). The world consists of N countries, part of them belonging to the trade bloc. 
Markets are characterized by monopolistic competition and increasing returns, allowing firms 
with a larger domestic market to produce at lower costs. Obstacles to trade are equal to zero at the 
domestic market, take a positive value within the trade bloc, and are highest for trade with 
countries outside the trade bloc. Two factors are employed in the production of K different 
goods: (immobile) skilled labor and (mobile) unskilled labor. The presence of fixed costs implies 
that each firm specializes in the production of one variety. An equilibrium of this model specifies 
the prices of all goods, the distribution of low-skilled workers among the countries within the 
trade bloc, wages and profits such that all markets clear, consumers maximize their utility, firms 
maximize profits, and no low-skilled workers can benefit from migration within the trade bloc.  
What happens, if one ore more countries enter the trade bloc? Technically, in the model the 
changes in equilibrium are triggered by the possibility of migration and changes in consumer 
prices. But as Casella argues the main lessons of the model can be read more broadly: Enlarging 
a trade bloc increases the size of the market that a firm can reach with relative ease. This increase 
will be more significant for firms located in small countries, whose own domestic market is 
small. This means that the increases in competitiveness are relatively larger for (firms in) small 
countries, such that the entry of new members in a trade bloc will favor particularly small 
countries.  This conclusion is reached by Casella both analytically (p. 405, proposition 4) and in a 
number of numerical simulations. In fact, the message of this model is very intuitive and general. 
If country size matters and favors large countries over small countries with respect to export 
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performance, any “enlargement of domestic market size” will allow the small country to partially 
offset its initial disadvantage over large countries, such that – at the margin – small countries gain 
more.  
This theoretical result lends itself directly to empirical testing by the study of the 
development of relative sales volumes. Badinger and Breuss (2006) consider the enlargements of 
the European Community (EC) by Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973 and 
Greece in 1981, as well as the free trade agreements between the EC and the members of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in the 1970s. The results are largely inconclusive; the 
authors stress that the mechanism favouring small countries appears to exist, but that for the 
sample considered, it is partially offset or even dominated by other forces favouring large 
countries (such as more group ties, higher market power and related terms-of-trade effects, larger 
absolute endowments with human capital, and a larger product variety).  
We will now consider how the theoretical arguments by Casella (1996) apply to the 
introduction of the Euro. Notice, that in the model, joining a trade bloc means nothing else but a 
reduction of the acceding country’s trade costs vis-à-vis all “old” members of the trade bloc, and 
simultaneously, a joint reduction of these old members’ trade costs vis-à-vis the joining country. 
Exactly the same reasoning applies to the introduction of the Euro. The introduction of the Euro 
increases the size of the market (by all other Euro area countries) that a firm can reach with 
relative ease. This increase will be more significant for firms located in small Euro area countries. 
Therefore, the introduction of the Euro should particularly favor small countries.  
Generally speaking, the introduction of the Euro makes access to other Euro area countries 
easier by reducing trade costs. This reduction in trade costs is due to two effects: the first and 
most obvious effect is a reduction in transaction costs from abolishing the need to exchange 
currencies and to hedge against exchange rate changes for example.  
 Trade Effects of the Euro: Small countries, Large Gains! 9 
 
A second mechanism, potentially more important as argued by Baldwin (2006a), is the 
reduction in fixed costs of introducing new goods into Euro area markets. These market entry 
costs are not explicitly considered in Casella (1996), where trade costs are modelled as „iceberg“ 
transportation costs. In this respect, the role of country size in determining the gains in trade are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the fixed costs to introduce a new variety in an export market are 
independent from market size; hence, small countries with smaller trade volumes are 
disproportionately favoured. In other words: the “break even” level of trade required to make 
foreign market entry favourable is reduced, which is probably less important for large countries 
that tend to exceed this threshold anyway. On the other hand, this mechanisms could potentially 
also favour large countries; on average they tend to produce a larger variety of goods, such that 
they have a larger change of market entry with new products (though it is unclear whether this 
would result in a relative gain of the large country, since large countries have already exported 
more product varieties before the Euro).  
The introduction of the Euro allows not only a reassessment whether a small country bonus 
postulated by Casella (1996) exists; it is a particularly suitable case to test for asymmetries in the 
gains in exports with respect to country size for several reasons: 
i) The size of enlargement (of the trading partner against which a reduction trade costs 
takes place) is important for the small country bonus to show up in the data. The introduction of 
the Euro constitutes a sizeable “trade bloc enlargement”, actually larger than any enlargement 
before, given that intra-Euro area trade makes up some 60 percent of total trade.  
ii) In the model by Casella (1996), the central mechanism is that the enlargement of the market 
is relatively larger for small countries. This is clearly the case here as well. In addition, also the 
absolute size of the enlargement is greater for small countries, bearing in mind that the “new” 
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market (to which access has become easier) is the total Euro area excluding the respective 
domestic market (which is smaller for the small country).  
iii) As opposed to previous enlargements, there is a relatively large sample of member 
countries within the Euro area with significant differences in size. This increases the number of 
observations, on which the model can be tested.  
iv) Finally, the Euro was introduced at a time period, for which comprehensive, high quality 
data is available. In particular, we will be able to test for a small country bonus using not only 
aggregate but also disaggregated trade data at the SITC1, SITC2, and SITC3 level. This is 
potentially important, to account for the intra-industry trade setup of the model by Casella (1996).  
Summing up, if the mechanism described in the model by Casella (1996) has any empirical 
relevance, a small country bonus should have emerged after the introduction of the Euro. In other 
words, if it does not show up in the data, it is likely to be of negligible relevance.  
It is worth emphasizing, that an assumption underlying our empirical test is that the size of 
the domestic market matters. Hence, our empirical analysis is in some way also an indirect test of 
the relevance of market size, which has been called into question by Rose (2007). Moreover, a 
further important assumption is that the EU (Euro area) countries are not fully integrated: If there 
were a true Single Market in the EU, all countries would have the same “domestic” market. In 
that case, the reasoning of the model by Casella (1996) would not apply any more. But the EU is 
still far away from a true Single Market. Apart from legal barriers, which still exist in many 
industries, particularly service industries (see, for example, European Commission, 2002), there 
are also cultural and language barriers (hindering migration in particular). This is also supported 
by the results of Chen (2004), who shows that there are still significant border effects on trade 
flows within the EU. This suggests that there are still sizeable trade costs within the Euro area, 
part of which have been eliminated by introducing the Euro.  
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2. The empirical model 
Our basic specification follows Casella (1996) and Badinger and Breuss (2006). It is based on a 
simple gravity approach in ratios, relating relative exports (X) of the large and small country to 
relative GDP, the relative real effective exchange rate (ER) and a Euro-Dummy (D€): 
 tt
tS
tL
tS
tL
tS
tL uD
ER
ER
GDP
GDP
X
X ++++= €
,
,
2
,
,
1€
,
€
, lnlnln γββα ,  (1) 
where €,tLX  are exports from the large country L to other Euro area countries (excluding the 
small country S), €,tSX  are exports from the small country S to other Euro area countries 
(excluding the large country L); tLGDP ,  ( tSGDP , ) is real GDP of the large country L (small 
country S); tLER ,  ( tSER , ) is the real exchange rate of large (small) country L (S) against the Euro 
area, and €tD  is a Euro-Dummy, taking a value of zero before the introduction of the Euro and 1 
afterwards). Finally, t is the time index and ut is a standard error term.  
Our sample comprises 10 Euro area countries (Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as 
aggregate) and covers the period 1994 to 2005. Data on trade flows are from the UN 
COMTRADE database and were downloaded from the database of the Austrian Institute of 
Economic Research (WIFO). Data on real GDP (2000 prices and 2000 PPPs) are taken from the 
OECD Economic Outlook Database. Data on real effective exchange rates against Euro area are 
from the European Commission (2007) and based on unit labor costs.   
Notice that equation (1) in ratios is consistent with simple versions of the gravity equation 
where time invariant determinants common in gravity equations (such as distance, common 
border, and common language) are captured by the constant. The parameter γ measures 
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the relative performance of the large country as a result of the Euro; according to the theoretical 
model we expect a negative value, indicating that the small country gained relatively more in 
trade with other Euro area countries than the large country.  
Several comments are in order here: As far as the dependent variable (exports to Euro area) 
is concerned, we have to exclude export flows, where the large or the small countries are the 
trading partners. Otherwise, the numerator and the denominator would not be directly 
comparable: the small country’s exports to the Euro area would include trade with the large 
country; the large country’s exports to the Euro area would include trade with the small country. 
Hence to ensure comparability, i.e. that the destination market is the same in the numerator (for 
the large country) and in the denominator (for the small country), we consider only exports to 
Euro area countries other than the respective large and small country. Notice that this destination 
market differs across ratios for obvious reasons. Moreover, it differs due to missing data; for 
example, if exports from the small country to Euro area country j are not available, it has to be 
excluded from the exports of the large country as well to ensure comparability.1 From a 
theoretical perspective, this not a problem, since the implications of the model by Casella (1996) 
could in principle be tested for relative exports of the large and small country to a single third 
country, though the empirical testing strategy is more promising if the largest possible destination 
market is used, that is the aggregate Euro area with the aforementioned adjustments.2  
The GDP ratio is included to captures changes in country size, and the relative real 
effective exchange rate is included to control for other variations in the competitiveness of the 
                                                 
1  At the aggregate and at the SITC1 level, this is not a problem; at the SITC2 level some bilateral trade flows are 
missing, but there are several ‘holes’ in the bilateral trade data at the SITC3 level. 
2  As argued in Badinger and Breuss (2006), an important motivation for choosing relative trade with all new 
member states is that building up new business relationships may also be interpreted as imposing a fixed 
component on trade costs. This would imply that when the enlargement occurs, firms would rather concentrate on 
one or a subset of all markets. 
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small and large country. In contrast to Casella (1996) and Badinger and Breuss (2006), who use 
only the overall real exchange rate of the large country, we include the relative real effective 
exchange rate of the large and small country against the Euro area. This appears to be more 
appropriate, given the destination market and the interpretation as gravity model in ratios. Our 
data for the real effective exchange rate is from the quarterly report on price and cost 
competitiveness of the European Commission (2007); of the various price indices available we 
opt for unit labor costs, but his choice is not crucial for the results of our main interest (i.e. the 
coefficient of the Euro-Dummy). Notice, that an increase in the real exchange rate is associated 
with a real appreciation vis-à-vis the other Euro area countries.  
At the time of the introduction of the Euro, the Euro area was made up by 11 countries, 
four of which would be typically considered as large (Germany, France, Italy, Spain). What is 
more relevant in our context is not the absolute, but the relative size of the countries, which we 
simply measure in terms of relative GDP, or alternatively, relative employment. We argue that a 
country is relatively large to another country if it is of double size in terms of GDP or 
employment; this appears to be a reasonable threshold, though any choice remains arbitrary to 
some extent. Since Belgium and Luxembourg have to be treated as aggregate due to data 
availability, we are left with 10 countries. Calculating all ratios of large to small countries, there 
are 32 of total 45 ratios, whose GDP or employment ratio exceeds the threshold of 2 (see 
Appendix A2).  
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We go on to set up a panel by pooling equation (1) for all 32 ratios of large to small 
countries. To simplify notation, we denote relative variables (large to small countries) with 
superscript REL, yielding  
 tit
REL
ti
REL
tii
REL
ti uDERGDPX ,
€
1,2,1, lnlnln ++++= γββα    (2) 
The cross-section dimension i is spanned by the 32 ratios of large to small countries summarized 
in Table A1 in the Appendix (i = 1, . . . , 32). Regarding the time dimension, we opt for a two 
period panel with averages over the period 1994-1998 (“Before”) and 2001-2005 (“After”). This 
helps to smooth out short run shocks and is more appropriate with a view to our goal of 
estimating medium- to long-run equilibrium effects. Another advantage of this choice is that 
possible non-stationarity of the time series3 is not of concern, given the equivalence of fixed 
effects estimation (in levels) and the first differenced estimator in a two period panel.  
The effects of the Euro have not materialized immediately. We assume that the main 
transition took place in the years 1999 and 2000. This is a conservative choice; Baldwin (2006a) 
argues that the break happened very quickly, appearing in 1999. By excluding the years 1999 and 
2000, we ensure that the estimated effects are not diluted by mixing up the period after the break 
with the transition period.  
Since we are interested in the average effect of the Euro on relative export performance of 
large to small countries, the parameter γ, which measures the relative gain of the large country, is 
restricted to be equal across countries.4 The same is true for the parameters of relative GDP and 
the relative real exchange rate as usual in gravity equations. Time invariant variables such as 
                                                 
3  Time series and panel unit root tests are inconclusive, but this uncertainty would shed some doubt on the results if 
longer time series were used.  
4  Technically, cross-section specific parameters for D€ are not estimable in this setup since they would be perfectly 
collinear with the fixed-effects. 
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distance, common border, common language, etc. are cross-section (i.e. ratio) specific and thus 
modeled using fixed effects, i.e. through cross-section specific intercepts. In this two period 
setting, the Euro-Dummy, taking a value of zero “before” (1994-1998) and a value of one “after” 
(2001-2005) has actually become a time specific-effect, which is not untypical for the variable 
measuring the structural break in intervention analyses.   
Equation (2) is our baseline model. In a next step, we will refine this empirical model and 
consider another implication that follows from the theoretical model by Casella (1996), i.e. that 
the magnitude of the small country bonus depends on the size difference between the large and 
the small country. This can be tested by interacting the Euro-Dummy with relative GDP: 
 ti
REL
titt
REL
ti
REL
tii
REL
ti uGDPDDERGDPX ,,
€
2
€
1,2,1, lnlnlnln +++++= γγββα .   (3) 
The relative gain of the large country is now given by γ1 + γ2lnGDPREL; this is an interesting 
extension of the testing strategy in Badinger and Breuss (2006). It is not only a refined model 
test, but may also help to identify thresholds of the size difference required to induce a small 
country bonus that dominates over other effects that may favor large countries (such as market 
power, network effects and group ties, for example).  
Finally, two assumptions underlying the theoretical model should be borne in mind. There 
are increasing returns to scale and trade is of intra-industry type. While intra-Euro area trade may 
largely be viewed to be of intra-industry type, the existence if increasing returns cannot be taken 
as granted at the aggregate level. Therefore, we will not only estimate equation (1) at the 
aggregate level, but also at the industry level, in particular for trade disaggregated at the SITC1, 
SITC2 and SITC3 level.  
One the one hand this is a desirable move towards intra-industry trade; on the other hand 
increasing returns are likely to be prevalent in many of the industries considered. We use the 
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most comprehensive approach, using data from the UN COM trade Database. This yields 10 
separate panels at the STIC1 level, 62 at the SITC2 level, and 246 at the SITC3 level. In terms of  
equation (2) or (3), only the dependent variable changes; the controls remain the same as before. 
On the one hand there is no data on value added and real exchange rates at the detailed SITC 
level used here. On the other hand, using aggregate data can be justified by the fact that for 
industries delivering intermediates to other industries, it is not only the size of the own sector that 
matters. Since cycles are not synchronized across industries, however, its coefficient becomes 
difficult to interpret and is of little interest in itself. 
Finally, moving down to an industry-specific equation has a further advantage. At a 
disaggregated level, in particular at the SITC3 level, where one single industry contributes only 
marginally to total value added, trade in this industry has a negligible GDP effect at best, 
mitigating the possible endogeneity problem, which is likely to exist as a result of reverse 
causality in the specification using aggregate trade flows. Hence, checking the consistency of the 
results from the disaggregated data with that of aggregate trade provides an important robustness 
check in our analysis, given the absence of strong and convincing instruments for the GDP ratio.  
 
III. Estimation Results 
1. Results for Aggregate Trade 
a) Basic model 
Table 1 presents the estimation results for equations (2) and (3). Notice that in our two period 
panel the fixed effects (FE) estimator is equivalent to the first differenced (FD) estimator, both 
with respect to estimation and inference. That is, our estimates can be obtained by a pooled 
regression of RELtiX ,ln∆ on RELtiGDP,ln∆ , RELtiER ,ln∆ , and €tD∆  (a constant).  
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 Table 1. LS and FGLS Estimates of Equations (2) and (3), Aggregate Trade 
Dependent variables is ln XREL 
  Equation (2) Equation (3) 
 LS LSHC FGLS LSHC FGLS 
lnGDPREL 0.765*** 0.765*** 0.764*** 0.753*** 0.803*** 
 (0.156) (0.116) (0.026) (0.101) (0.043) 
lnERREL -0.143 -0.143 -0.073 -0.229* -0.159** 
 (0.232) (0.111) (0.063) (0.119) (0.068) 
D€ -2.653 -2.653 -3.231*** 7.104 4.793* 
 (2.978) (1.837) (0.528) (4.357) (2.499) 
 lnGDPREL×D€    -6.111** -5.303*** 
    (2.569) (1.403) 
      
Adj. R2 0.417 0.417 0.413 0.455 0.439 
SE  0.134 0.134 0.134 0.129 0.131 
N 32 32 32 32 32 
T 2 2 2 2 2 
obs 64 64 64 64 64 
Notes: LS ... Least squares estimates, LSHC .. Fixed effects estimates using asymptotic heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors, FGLS ... Feasible generalized least squares estimates, using cross-section weights. To ensure 
comparability, the standard error of estimation and the adjusted R2 always refers to first differences differenced 
models and are based on unweighted residuals.  The Euro-Dummy is divided by 100, such that the coefficient is to 
be interpreted in percent.  
 
The first column shows the least squares (LS) estimates. The relative GDP is positive as 
expected with an elasticity around three quarters and highly significant; the real effective 
exchange rate shows the right sign but is insignificant. The same holds true for the coefficient of 
the Euro-Dummy: it is negative, pointing to a small country bonus, but not significant at 
conventional levels.  
Notably, there are large differences in the squared standard errors over the cross-sections, 
ranging from 0.01 to 0.2. As can be confirmed by more formal tests, this points to the presence of 
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heteroscedasticity, which has to be addressed for valid inference. While in a two period panel, 
FE- and FD-estimation produce identical estimates and standard inference, this is not true for the 
robust covariance estimator.5 Hence, one has to decide which estimator (FD or FE) is the proper 
one, in order to use the right covariance correction. This choice hinges on the properties of the 
error term u in equation (2); if it is white noise, FE is the efficient estimator; if it is a random 
walk, FD is efficient. In practice, the truth will lie somewhere in between, such that the strength 
of the serial correlation is typically used as guide. In a two period panel, testing for serial 
correlation does not appear to be very promising, and theoretical reasoning does not help along. 
For comparison, column two shows the results, when the corrected covariance, based on the FE 
estimates, is used. The standard errors remain fairly large, in particular of the Euro-Dummy, 
which is the variable of our primary interest.6  
To improve the efficiency of our estimates, we move on with a weighted least squares 
approach. This “is a natural route to follow if the robust standard errors of the fixed effects 
estimator are too large to be useful.“ (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 276). In the present context, cross-
section weights are the obvious choice: The resulting weighted fixed effects and first differences 
estimation produce identical estimates and inference; this has the further advantage that it 
dispenses us from making a choice between (inference based on) FD or FE estimation. 
The weighted or feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimates of equation (2), using 
cross section weights are given in column three of Table 1. It is reassuring that the parameter 
estimates do not differ dramatically from the least squares approach. At the same time the 
standard errors of the coefficients shrink considerably, with the consequence that the coefficient 
                                                 
5  Compare the corrected covariances for the FE estimator (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 275) and for the FD estimator 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 282). 
6  If the correction is based on the FD residuals, results are similar: p-values become smaller as well, though slightly 
less 
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of the Euro-Dummy becomes significant at the one percent level. The real effective exchange rate 
remains insignificant, however.  
The goodness of fit hardly differs between the two estimates and is satisfactory with an R2 
around 40 percent. In order to ensure comparability, all R2s and standard errors (SE) reported 
refer to the original model in first differences and are based on unweighted residuals. Since there 
is no precise counterpart to the R2 in the generalized regression model, the values for the GLS 
estimates should be regarded as purely descriptive.7 
We can now turn to an assessment of the economic significance of the estimates; since the 
Euro-Dummy is scaled by a factor of 1/100, its effect on relative exports can be read off directly 
from its coefficient in percent. The estimate points to an average small country bonus of some 3 
percent; while this is no dramatic reallocation, of course, it is nevertheless significant in 
economic terms as well, given that this amounts to roughly one percent of GDP. Moreover, it 
should be borne in mind that this figure represents the net effect. As argued in Badinger and 
Breuss (2006), there may also be forces favoring large countries. What our results suggest is that 
the small country bonus dominates; the ceteris paribus effect depicted in the model by Casella 
(1996) could even be higher. Moreover, we cannot expect the small country bonus to show up 
always and everywhere (i.e. for any product at the disaggregated level and any ratio of countries). 
Nevertheless, our results suggest that small countries gained more on average and that this also 
shows up at the aggregate level. 
                                                 
7  Since the GLS estimator minimizes the sum of squared residuals, its R2 cannot be compared directly to the 
unweighted estimates. As expected, the adjusted R2 of the weighted models is much higher (and its standard error 
slightly smaller) than that of the unweighted models. But the weighted model to which the generalized R2 refers to 
is just a computational device, not the model of primary interest. Moreover, neither the R2 based on the weighted 
nor that based on the unweighted model are bounded by the unit interval (see Greene, 2003, p. 209).  
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A final qualification to the results shall be discussed. It could be that endogeneity as a result 
of reverse causality from relative exports to relative GDP biases our estimates. In this case the 
coefficient of the GDP ratio (i.e. the slope) would be upward biased, the coefficient of the Euro-
Dummy (i.e. the constant) would be downward biased. Unfortunately, in the present context there 
are no convincing, high quality instruments available; any variable affecting GDP is likely to 
affect trade as well.  
Hence, an important robustness check will be to see whether the results hold up at a more 
disaggregated level, where endogeneity is of less concern. Comparing the weighted with the 
unweighted least squares estimates allows a preliminary assessment. In the absence of 
endogeneity, they are both unbiased and should be similar. If endogeneity is present, both 
estimates are biased but the bias is different for the two estimators; hence pronounced 
endogeneity would drive a large wedge between the unweighted and weighted estimates, in 
particular for the estimate of the parameter of relative GDP. This is not the case here: judged by 
their standard errors, the weighted and unweighted parameter estimates are fairly similar.  
 
b) Extended model  
We go on to test model (3), which postulates that the relative gains in exports are a function of 
relative size. Column (4) shows the fixed effects estimates with corrected standard errors, column 
(5) the FGLS results. Including the interaction of relative GDP with the Euro-Dummy, the fit of 
the model improves slightly. The parameter estimates for relative GDP and the real exchange rate 
remain essential unchanged, but the latter becomes significant now as well. In the unweighted 
regression, the p-value of the Euro-Dummy (D€) improves to 0.110; the interaction term is 
significant at the 5 percent level. In the weighted regression both variables are significant at the 
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10 and 1 percent level, respectively. They are also jointly significant in both the unweighted 
regression (p-value: 0.026) and the weighted regression (p-value: 0.001). 
In the weighted model, the magnitude of the average effect, evaluated at the mean of the 
GDP ratio is -4.242 percent, which is in line with the results for the basic model (2). Depending 
on the size difference, the overall effect ranges from -11.232 to 1.748. The threshold of the size 
difference in terms of relative GDP, as of which the small country gains more (i.e. the small 
country bonus starts to dominate) is 2.5 (in levels). Only five of the 32 size ratios of our sample 
are below this threshold (AT-IE, BE-FI, NL-AT, NL-PT, PT-IE). For all other ratios, the size 
difference between the large and small country is sufficiently large to yield a negative overall 
effect. 
Summing up, the estimates for aggregate trade suggest that there appears to be a small 
country bonus; there is also evidence that the relative gain of the small over the large country 
increases with the size difference. A limitation of the results is that they are not perfectly robust 
across all models and estimation methods. This might be due to the fact that effects differ under 
the surface of aggregate trade, which implies much ‘averaging’. We will thus turn to the 
disaggregated analysis in a next step.  
 
2. Results for Disaggregated Trade Data 
a) Basic model  
Using disaggregated data is an important refinement of the empirical testing strategy: In the 
model by Casella (1996) trade is of intra-industry type; moreover, for the small country bonus to 
exist, there must be increasing returns. Notice that, as already mentioned above, only the 
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dependent variable (i.e. the export ratio) is replaced by industry data in equations (2) and (3), 
whereas the control variables (relative GDP and real exchange rate) remain the same as before.     
Table 2 summarizes the results of the unweighted and weighted estimates of the basic 
model (2) form a bird eye’s perspective (Detailed results are given in the Appendix). It shows the 
shares of the positive, negative, and insignificant parameter estimates for the three levels of 
aggregation. Of course, we cannot expect the small country bonus to dominate always and 
everywhere. But it is reassuring that for all three levels of aggregation and for both the 
unweighted and weighted estimates, a negatively significant parameter estimate (suggesting a 
small country bonus) is the most frequent result. This is particularly pronounced at the SITC1 
level, but it also holds up at the SITC2 and SITC3 level.  
 
Table 2. FGLS and LS Estimates of Model (2) for Disaggregated Data, Overview of Results  
a) weighted estimates 
  Shares2) Average (all)3) Average (sign.)3) 
 Total1) –  + 0  µ σ  µ σ 
SITC1 10 50.00 10.00 40.00 -7.297 0.498 -6.699 0.349 
SITC2 62 59.68 20.97 19.35 -9.156 0.365 -9.183 0.350 
SITC3 246 47.15 32.52 20.33 -5.228 0.304 -5.387 0.293 
b) unweighted estimates 
 Total1) – + 0  µ σ  µ σ 
SITC1 10 40.00 0.00 60.00 -6.516 1.302 -6.452 0.778 
SITC2 62 33.87 14.52 51.61 -9.602 1.360 -8.813 1.182 
SITC3 246 31.71 19.51 48.78 -4.863 0.814 -3.979 0.606 
Notes: 1) Total number of estimates at the respective SITC levels. 2) share of cases where coefficient of D€ is 
negatively significant, positively significant, and insignificant respectively; significance level: 5 percent. 3) Trade 
share weighted averages of all (significant) coefficients; standard deviation calculated assuming that the industry-
specific coefficients are independent.  
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In a next step we check whether the industry specific results are in line with the aggregate 
estimates, by summing up the SITC-level specific estimates using the respective trade share in 
total trade as weights. The implied effects generally exceed those from the estimates for total 
trade: We arrive at an average aggregate effect of some 7 percent at the SITC1 level, 9 percent at 
the STIC2 level, and some 5 percent at the SITC3 level.  
 
b) Extended model  
Both the aggregate estimates and the disaggregated estimates of model (2) point to a small 
country bonus on average; the aggregate estimates of the extended model (3) also suggest that the 
magnitude of the size difference is important: the estimates suggest that the small country bonus 
starts to dominate as of a size ratio of 2.5. We now consider this extended equation (3) from a 
more disaggregated perspective. 
We proceed as follows: Model (3) is estimated at the SITC1, SITC2, SITC3 level. We start 
by showing in how many of the cases the coefficients of the Euro-Dummy and the interaction of 
the Euro-Dummy with the GDP ratio are jointly significant. Only then, the effect of the Euro on 
trade can be reasonably regarded to be a function of relative market size. (A more stringent test 
would require both variables to be significant separately as well).  
For the cases, where the joint p-value (of γ1 and γ2 in equation (3)) points to a significant 
effect, there are four possible outcomes. Both coefficients can be negative or positive: then there 
is an unambiguous small or large country bonus. Table 3 shows the respective shares of estimates 
at the different levels of aggregation; the shares of the cases with a joint negative effect range 
from 20 to 33 percent, which is clearly larger than the share of cases where bith coefficients are 
positive.  
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Table 3. FGLS and LS Estimates of Model (3) for Disaggregated Data, Overview of Results  
a) weighted estimates 
Distribution of coefficients 3) Total 4) 
 Total1) Share of significant 2) –   – +   + +   – –   + –   – +   + 
SITC1 10 60.00 33.33 0.00 66.67 0.00 100.00 0.00 
SITC2 62 88.71 27.27 10.91 41.82 20.00 69.09 30.91 
SITC3 246 84.96 20.10 11.00 45.93 22.97 66.03 33.97 
         
b) unweighted estimates 
Distribution of coefficients 3) Total 4) 
 Total1) Share of significant 2) –   – +   + +   – –   + –   – +   + 
SITC1 10 40.00 75.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
SITC2 62 53.23 27.27 9.09 51.52 12.12 78.79 21.21 
SITC3 246 56.91 20.00 14.29 42.86 22.86 62.86 37.14 
Notes: 1) Total number of estimates at the respective SITC levels. 2) share of cases where coefficient of D€ and 
GDPRELD€ are jointly significant; significance level: 5 percent. 3) Distribution of coefficients among possible 
outcomes; the first sign refers to coefficients of D€, second sign to that of the interaction term. 4) Total distribution, 
where the potentially ambiguous cases (+  – and –   +), which are unambiguous for our given of GDP ratios, 
were assigned to the cases – – and + +. 
 
Alternatively, the coefficients could have the opposite sign; then the effect is ambiguous, 
depending on relative country size. Table 3 shows the respective shares of the cases where the 
two coefficients take the opposite sign. For each of these cases, we calculate the threshold for the 
size ratio, as of which the direction of the effect changes. Fortunately, we find that in no single 
industry, the threshold is of relevance for our sample: it is always clearly below 2, the smallest 
size ratio in our sample. In several cases, the threshold is even below one which is actually ruled 
in the given specification of ratios from „large to small“. Hence we can sharpen the results by 
adding the shares with a potentially ambiguous but actually unambiguous effect to the shares 
where both coefficients show the same sign. The last two columns in Table 3 show the 
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corresponding shares. The results are even strengthened: In two third of the cases where the 
relative gains depend on relative size, small countries gained relatively more.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper tests for asymmetries in the trade effects of the Euro with respect to country size. Our 
empirical model is motivated by the new-trade theory model by Casella (1996), which 
investigates the distributions of the gains from trade bloc enlargement among its member states. 
We argue that the implications of this model hold up for the introduction of a common currency 
as well: The intuition is that if country size matters – e.g. if larger countries are more competitive 
since a large domestic market allows them to produce at lower costs – large countries have a 
starting advantage. But this also means that any regime shift that induces an increase in the 
market size (or the size of the market that can be reached with relative ease) triggers a catching 
up effect of the small country, since its relative market expansion is larger. As a consequence, the 
induced increase in competitiveness is relatively larger for the small country, such that it should 
be able to improve its export performance relative to the large country.  
We use a gravity model in ratios, relating relative exports (of the large and small country to 
the Euro area) to relative GDP and the relative real exchange rate and test for a small country 
bonus as a result of the Euro, using 32 ratios of large to small countries over two time periods:  
“before” (1994-1998) and “after” (2001-2005) the introduction of the Euro. The estimation is 
carried out both for aggregate exports and also at the SITC1, SITC2, and SITC3 industry level.  
While a small country bonus does not show up always and everywhere, the overall results 
are supportive to the theoretical predictions by Casella (1996). This is true both at the aggregate 
level and at the industry level, where we find that small countries gained more on average in a 
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majority of the SITC groups considered. On average over all models, we find that the Euro has 
led to a ‘reallocation’ of intra-Euro area exports to small countries by some 6 percent. In addition, 
we also find that the magnitude of the relative gain often depends on the size difference between 
the large and the small country. 
A broader reading of the results suggest that country size is an important mechanism 
shaping economic performance, but that it operates at subtle levels. The model by Casella (1996) 
and the supporting evidence in this paper make a convincing case that there exists a small country 
bonus, but the particular transmission channel considered is certainly not the only one if 
increasing returns to scale are assumed, and other mechanisms favouring large countries (such as 
group ties and network effects) are conceivable as well. A more complete and integrated 
theoretical framework, which depicts the channels through which country size matters, remains to 
be developed in future research. This would also allow to impose more structure on the empirical 
testing strategy and help to identify not only the net effect of enlarging a trade bloc or introducing 
a common currency, but also to identify the various mechanisms at work and to assess their 
empirical relevance.  
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Appendix Tables  
 
Table A2.1 Size Relationships: Large to Small Countries 
Relatively large 
country i 
Relatively small 
country j 
Relative EMPL  
(i to j) 
Relative GDP  
(i to j) 
AT IE 2.5 2.2 
BE FI 1.8 2.1 
 IE 2.5 2.6 
DE AT 9.4 9.1 
 BE 9.5 7.7 
 ES 2.6 2.5 
 FI 16.8 15.8 
 IE 23.8 20.2 
 NL 4.8 4.6 
 PT 7.9 11.2 
ES AT 3.6 3.6 
 BE 3.6 3.1 
 FI 6.5 6.3 
 IE 9.2 8.1 
 PT 3.0 4.5 
FR AT 5.8 6.8 
 BE 5.8 5.8 
 FI 10.3 11.8 
 IE 14.5 15.1 
 NL 3.0 3.5 
 PT 4.8 8.4 
IT AT 5.0 6.3 
 BE 5.0 5.4 
 FI 9.0 11.1 
 IE 12.7 14.2 
 NL 2.6 3.2 
 PT 4.2 7.9 
NL AT 1.9 2.0 
 FI 3.5 3.4 
 IE 4.9 4.4 
 PT 1.6 2.4 
PT IE 3.0 1.8 
Notes: Data on Employment and GDP in 1999 (in PPPs) taken from OECD Economic Outlook Database. 
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Table A2.2 Estimation Results for Equation (2) at SITC1 and SITC2 Level for Parameter of D€ 
 Coefficient of D€ SITC2 Coefficient of D€  Coefficient of D€ 
SITC1 LS FGLS SITC2 LS FGLS SITC2 LS FGLS 
X0 -23.55*** -25.75*** X01 -9.94 -14.11*** X56 -67.60*** -65.37*** 
X1 -15.95* -13.87*** X02 -18.31* -18.36*** X57 -4.52 -3.04*** 
X2 1.76 -0.08 X03 11.76 11.58*** X58 -12.05* -12.75*** 
X3 -45.65*** -45.93*** X04 -27.91*** -29.31*** X59 10.09** 11.89*** 
X4 -25.35*** -26.19*** X05 -28.79*** -27.11*** X61 -4.94 -4.47 
X5 0.19 0.39 X06 -34.71*** -34.32*** X62 -13.98* -11.73*** 
X6 -3.09 -3.81* X07 6.17 7.29*** X63 1.18 -1.89 
X7 -7.43*** -8.28*** X08 -4.96 -9.67*** X64 19.24*** 19.11*** 
X8 4.85 3.75** X09 -48.81*** -46.45*** X65 -8.45* -8.17*** 
X9 1.50 0.76 X11 -14.31** -13.32*** X66 -5.54 -7.77*** 
   X12 -43.36 -39.44*** X67 -25.35** -24.03*** 
   X21 -9.96 -12.65*** X68 -39.59*** -33.25*** 
   X22 -52.31*** -51.48*** X69 -4.32 -3.71* 
   X23 -51.37*** -49.98*** X71 2.51 4.73* 
   X24 -4.73 -11.95*** X72 -13.41*** -13.32*** 
   X25 39.80*** 37.30*** X73 -4.41 -1.90 
   X26 -73.57*** -75.27*** X74 -18.20*** -18.41*** 
   X27 11.97* 4.50 X75 -48.95** -51.54*** 
   X28 14.86*** 12.52*** X76 19.68*** 21.79*** 
   X29 -2.60 -3.32*** X77 -4.40 -4.45*** 
   X32 57.43*** 58.15*** X78 -16.16*** -15.47*** 
   X33 -13.43 -13.14*** X79 14.67 14.39*** 
   X34 -113.15** -108.62*** X81 -6.17 -4.98*** 
   X41 -4.96 -5.06** X82 -17.67*** -19.67*** 
   X42 -52.77*** -59.99*** X83 23.93*** 22.83*** 
   X43 -11.88 7.25 X84 26.94*** 22.45*** 
   X51 -30.49*** -28.03*** X85 -27.52*** -27.75*** 
   X52 16.28** 5.39* X87 5.47* 4.52*** 
   X53 -51.13*** -52.27*** X88 -5.12 -3.56 
   X54 22.04* 30.09*** X89 -1.54 -0.25 
   X55 3.40 4.42* X97 -18.50 -12.64 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.   
 Trade Effects of the Euro: Small Countries, Large Gains!   29 
Table A2.3 Estimation Results for Equation (2) at SITC3 Level for Parameter of D€ 
 Coefficient of D€  Coefficient of D€  Coefficient of D€ 
SITC3 LS FGLS SITC3 LS FGLS SITC3 LS FGLS 
X011 7.99 6.30 X514 -44.62*** -40.96*** X711 -54.58*** -51.04*** 
X012 -17.61 -14.80*** X515 -54.88*** -54.61*** X712 57.41 42.05 
X016 14.57 15.06*** X516 -6.23 -7.46*** X713 -6.54 -5.93 
X017 10.67 13.85*** X522 22.29** 4.97 X714 51.69*** 48.88*** 
X022 2.56 2.91*** X523 -16.52* -18.10*** X716 -1.12 -0.22 
X023 -49.06*** -45.28*** X524 8.77 2.39 X718 -48.33*** -35.49*** 
X024 16.02 11.21* X525 38.25** 36.76*** X721 -14.59** -12.17*** 
X025 59.93** 68.49*** X531 -63.62*** -58.11*** X722 13.52 18.34*** 
X034 -18.32** -18.30*** X532 -58.20*** -52.46*** X723 -40.71*** -43.09*** 
X035 -34.41** -48.28*** X533 -40.82*** -41.12*** X724 -21.47*** -20.40*** 
X036 -29.70*** -27.17*** X541 11.38 11.82*** X725 0.38 2.54* 
X037 84.63*** 83.61*** X542 27.09** 28.26*** X726 -15.87 -17.25*** 
X041 -20.14 -22.69*** X551 21.71*** 21.99*** X727 6.94 6.92*** 
X042 25.36** 22.68*** X553 13.12** 15.58*** X728 -16.75** -14.69*** 
X043 10.59 13.85*** X554 -16.31** -18.91*** X731 -18.38*** -18.38*** 
X044 8.51 4.18 X562 -67.60*** -65.37*** X733 12.37 11.69*** 
X045 -43.10** -38.84*** X571 -4.18 -8.19*** X735 -4.85 -6.78*** 
X046 -22.53* -7.18 X572 -6.46 -8.48*** X737 -19.50** -27.79*** 
X047 28.57 36.98*** X573 -8.91 -8.78*** X741 -11.23** -9.89*** 
X048 -15.37** -14.68*** X574 12.99 6.79*** X742 -28.94*** -28.95*** 
X054 -40.76*** -25.72*** X575 -28.46*** -26.39*** X743 -42.15*** -40.48*** 
X056 -1.20 -4.23 X579 6.19 2.52 X744 -6.94** -7.09*** 
X057 -32.46*** -35.11*** X581 18.87*** 22.58*** X745 -5.46 -5.18*** 
X058 -75.97*** -74.00*** X582 -12.16* -11.05*** X746 5.42 3.67 
X059 -14.19* -18.67*** X583 -24.83*** -26.36*** X747 -26.75** -29.60*** 
X061 -40.66*** -40.61*** X591 30.64*** 27.65*** X748 4.39 2.56 
X062 -6.59 -6.53*** X592 6.24 7.81*** X749 -36.71*** -35.39*** 
X071 4.43 4.63 X593 -60.21*** -56.64*** X751 -26.89* -20.76*** 
X072 -158.04*** -169.92*** X597 93.79*** 78.52*** X752 -24.40 -52.04*** 
X073 3.87 8.07*** X598 7.40 3.16 X759 -63.42*** -49.36*** 
X074 -33.25 -26.65* X611 12.51* 12.03*** X761 45.08** 48.34*** 
X075 -6.39 -7.02** X612 -6.60 -6.42 X762 5.62 8.23** 
X081 -4.96 -9.67*** X613 -2.40 -2.08 X763 97.21*** 94.26*** 
X091 -16.55 -16.12 X621 -18.78* -21.38*** X764 25.77*** 26.26*** 
X098 -44.30*** -42.92*** X625 -17.95 -16.01*** X771 17.95** 15.74*** 
X111 -11.71 -10.36*** X629 -27.62*** -25.21*** X772 -2.87 -3.06** 
X112 -1.59 -1.73 X633 -15.42 -14.01* X773 13.27*** 13.88*** 
X121 -36.94* -30.92*** X634 9.39* 7.57*** X774 0.18 -2.32 
X122 -47.06* -40.80*** X635 -3.05 -2.93* X775 -6.65 -9.20*** 
X211 3.49 5.30 X641 23.32*** 24.52*** X776 3.60 7.66*** 
X212 57.61 71.42*** X642 39.31*** 38.74*** X778 -18.44*** -19.36*** 
X222 -63.45*** -67.09*** X651 0.17 0.07 X781 -12.77** -12.87*** 
X223 -42.05*** -47.76*** X652 -11.14 -9.18** X782 5.58 4.17* 
X231 41.41 61.59** X653 -8.99 -11.24** X783 -13.02 -12.28*** 
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Table A2.3 (continued) Estimation Results for Equation (2) at SITC3 Level for Parameter of D€ 
 Coefficient of D€  Coefficient of D€  Coefficient of D€ 
SITC3 LS FGLS SITC3 LS FGLS SITC3 LS FGLS 
X232 -48.99*** -51.50*** X654 -21.92*** -21.48*** X784 -18.51*** -17.45*** 
X244 145.11 114.14* X655 31.99** 21.59*** X785 -32.58*** -31.70*** 
X245 -88.67*** -99.89*** X656 24.87*** 26.25*** X786 -29.96*** -27.56*** 
X246 8.90 4.83 X657 -17.13** -15.56*** X791 30.46** 22.55** 
X247 17.92** 18.58*** X658 -9.60*** -9.20*** X792 4.27 1.05 
X248 15.99 12.13*** X659 -19.07** -20.09*** X793 47.57** 47.12*** 
X251 39.80*** 37.30*** X661 -16.14** -20.94*** X811 44.92*** 39.60*** 
X263 -62.31*** -57.38*** X662 31.81*** 33.27*** X812 -4.50 -3.74 
X265 46.11*** 33.66*** X663 -20.39*** -19.74*** X813 -7.59** -9.02*** 
X266 -29.18*** -28.10*** X664 -11.66** -10.16*** X821 -17.67*** -19.67*** 
X267 -85.83*** -89.12*** X665 -14.93** -11.64*** X831 23.93*** 22.83*** 
X268 -22.61 -17.21*** X666 9.28 8.26*** X841 46.94*** 46.81*** 
X269 -37.72*** -40.16*** X667 50.17*** 61.39*** X842 39.65*** 36.36*** 
X272 -63.63*** -58.22*** X671 19.70 19.81*** X843 33.82*** 31.48*** 
X273 -1.59 -0.45 X672 -3.32 -14.62* X844 33.84*** 34.22*** 
X274 -69.47*** -56.98*** X673 18.50* 20.37*** X845 6.18 3.75 
X277 0.25 -31.82 X674 -6.83 -7.39*** X846 25.90*** 26.86*** 
X278 -19.91*** -23.49*** X675 23.84* 23.29*** X848 7.48 12.85* 
X282 4.79 2.53 X676 -26.88* -22.56*** X851 -27.52*** -27.75*** 
X285 135.21** 150.34*** X677 105.54*** 99.39*** X871 43.43*** 40.45*** 
X287 0.50 -9.58 X678 6.47 11.00*** X872 4.40 4.55*** 
X288 0.56 1.89* X679 -12.57 -11.25*** X873 11.25* 14.27*** 
X289 129.09*** 122.29*** X681 33.31 21.44* X874 7.57*** 6.03*** 
X291 7.59 8.81*** X682 -27.81*** -20.98*** X881 26.36** 26.68*** 
X292 -8.61 -8.40*** X683 -66.68*** -71.35*** X882 35.24*** 35.17*** 
X321 -302.33*** -286.95*** X684 -36.89*** -35.71*** X883 -31.11* -26.79 
X322 -0.88 1.40 X685 -112.29*** -113.15*** X884 -25.36*** -28.15*** 
X334 -21.15** -21.41*** X686 -41.18** -44.75*** X885 4.93 3.00 
X335 15.66*** 16.91*** X687 -18.31 2.66 X891 18.45 23.84** 
X342 72.19*** 73.50*** X689 108.55*** 109.40*** X892 12.82*** 10.15*** 
X344 -150.22** -108.34*** X691 -31.31** -35.97*** X893 -8.02 -7.56*** 
X411 -4.96 -5.06** X692 7.53 8.95* X894 -0.12 2.68* 
X421 -55.57*** -57.41*** X693 3.19 0.52 X895 -2.34 -2.69*** 
X422 -21.54* -19.56** X694 -32.15*** -29.67*** X896 8.96 10.89*** 
X431 -11.88 7.25 X695 -24.91*** -22.32*** X897 5.98 7.89* 
X511 8.83 9.15*** X696 3.04 7.40** X898 -16.10* -12.71*** 
X512 11.08 17.14** X697 4.25 3.18** X899 32.53** 25.94*** 
X513 44.57*** 43.07*** X699 -5.39 -6.43*** X971 -18.50 -12.64 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.   
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